As the global order fragments, a group of “non-aligned” countries are gaining increasing importance. Countries like India and Saudi Arabia are forging deals across traditional divides and seeking to have a greater say in world affairs. While these countries may never act as a unified bloc, their influence cannot be ignored. Their growing role is impacting various aspects, including the spike in oil prices, the remaking of supply chains, and the prospects for peace in Ukraine. However, their ascent also raises a significant question: in the competition between China and the West for influence over these countries, who will come out on top?
Non-alignment, as a concept, has a checkered past. It originated in the 1950s as an alliance of developing states aiming to assert their newfound sovereignty amidst the escalating tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, over the years, the movement lost cohesion and devolved into grandstanding and anti-American sentiment. With limited military power, no permanent seat on the UN security council, and lacking economic influence or a significant presence in technology and finance, the non-aligned movement held little sway. In fact, in 1956, America’s secretary of state at the time, John Foster Dulles, referred to non-alignment as “immoral.” By the end of the Cold War, the movement had become irrelevant.
At first glance, the current group of ostensibly neutral countries face many of the same challenges as the non-aligned movement did in the 20th century. They lack a common agenda or shared interests, with even large democracies like Brazil and India having few commonalities with cash-rich monarchies like Qatar. These countries still rely on the West, China, and Russia for technologies and trade predominantly in US dollars.
However, underestimating their influence would be a mistake for two reasons. First, their economic clout is on the rise. The 25 largest non-aligned economies, referred to as the “transactional-25,” account for 45% of the world’s population. Their share of global GDP has increased from 11% to 18% since the fall of the Berlin Wall, surpassing that of the European Union. Their trade patterns are multipolar, with a significant portion split between the West, China, and other non-aligned states.
Second, their approach to the world has become ruthlessly pragmatic, shaped by their desire for national development. These countries have unexpectedly become staunch defenders of globalization. They aim to trade freely with both sides of the geopolitical divide and take advantage of opportunities arising from supply chain restructuring away from overreliance on China. They also harbor limited confidence in the institutions established by the American-led post-1945 order, such as the UN and IMF, viewing them as disorderly and decaying. Western appeals for the defense of the liberal order or human rights are often seen as self-serving, inconsistent, and hypocritical.
Consequently, these countries adopt a fluid, transactional approach to the world, pursuing their own interests through individual or collective actions. For instance, OPEC, the oil cartel, has become more assertive, recently cutting production despite Western objections. Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, is proposing a “peace club” to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. India, as the current president of the G20, aims to advocate for the global south. These countries are also expanding their influence in various sectors. India seeks to export its digital services, Turkey is increasing arms sales, including drones, and India is expanding its navy. Moreover, the financial system for reinvesting petrodollars is becoming less centered on the West. Given their limited historical responsibility for carbon emissions and vulnerability to changing weather patterns, non-aligned countries understandably desire a greater say in climate policy.
While China perceives non-aligned countries as easily swayed and offers them infrastructure, technology, and arms with minimal strings attached, their long-term vulnerability may lead them to realize that a might-makes-right world favors bullies more than anyone else. Authoritarian China’s soft power has its limits, as citizens of countries that accept Chinese investments are not clamoring to relocate to Beijing.
Despite the need for the West to compete for influence, it must resist resorting to tactics that mirror those of authoritarian opponents. Relying solely on appeals to the post-World War II liberal order will not suffice. Instead, the West should engage with non-aligned countries on their own transactional terms, employing a combination of incentives and consequences. The West’s enduring strengths, such as market access, technology, and the free flow of information, can be leveraged. Additionally, offering a more adaptable network of security relationships, similar to the one America has with India, and providing tangible benefits like debt relief and climate finance can enhance the West’s appeal. Although the current world order is far from America’s unipolar moment in the 1990s, the West can still compete for influence in the marketplace. With over 4 billion people keen to see what it has to offer, the West must adapt to the changing dynamics and seize the opportunities presented by non-aligned countries.
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From The Economist, published under license. The original content can be found on www.economist.com.
Non-aligned countries are playing an increasingly important role in the global order as it fragments. Despite lacking cohesion and military power, these countries are gaining economic influence and adopting a pragmatic approach to the world. They are becoming defenders of globalization and seeking to trade freely with both sides of the geopolitical divide. Non-aligned countries are acting alone or in concert to assert their power in various sectors such as tech, defense, and finance. However, as China and the West vie for influence over these countries, the question remains as to who will prevail. The West must engage with non-aligned countries in transactional terms and offer a mix of incentives and benefits to compete for influence in the evolving world order.
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